Politicizing Skepticism – Agonal Thought for Democracy

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Resumo
O estudo ora apresentado tem como objetivo mostrar como uma atitude cética e agônica são imperativos no pensamento político em direção à democracia. Partindo do paradigma de mundos políticos possíveis, a maioria das teorias acerca da democracia revelam-se como algumas dentre as muitas possíveis para configurar e reconfigurar o mundo ordinário. Ademais, o conceito de “epoché” herdado pelo ceticismo direciona a um incessante debate entre teorias e Weltanschauungen. Desta forma, o pensamento agônico direciona a um impossível julgamento em termos de “verdadeiro/falso”, em resumo a ausência de um verdadeiro conhecimento político. O trabalho discute como o pensamento político, especificamente no referente às “teorias da democracia”, precisam ser vistos sob uma inconstante realidade axiológica, a qual reforça o caráter fideísta de qualquer decisão política, isto é, apenas uma aposta em determinado poder soberano certo de seu potencial para prover a transição do caos à ordem com a consequente normatividade.

Palavras-chave: Democracia; ceticismo; epistemologia.

Abstract
The study hereby proposed aims to show how a skeptical and agonal attitude is an imperative demand on political thinking towards democracy. Departing from the paradigm of several possible political worlds, most theories on democracy reveal themselves as just one of multiple possibilities to configure and reconfigure the ordinary world. Therefore, the skeptic’s legacy on the concept of ‘epoché’ accrues an unceasing benevolent debate between theories and Weltanschauungen. This way, some agonal way of thinking causes the inexorability of any judgment in terms of “true/false”, summarizing the absence of a truly political knowledge. The paper discusses how political thought, especially concerning

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'Democracy theories', must be understood under an unstable axiological reality, which reinforces the fideist approach of any political decision, that is, merely a bet from a circumscribed sovereign power confident on its own potential to provide transition from chaos to order with the consequent normativity.

**Keywords:** Democracy; skepticism; epistemology.

**Introduction**

The present work begins with an exaltation of the political philosophy, in other words, it aims a certain contribution to show that the so precious separation between such reflexive ethos and another from a more empiricist nature is something pernicious, in contrariety of what can be noticed at the general political science. Such distinction is “obscure, obscurantist and makes no justice to those two working areas, which are essential to the constitution of the subject. One gives sense to the other. One cannot exist without the other.”⁴ (LESSA, 2003, p.81)

Moreover, it highlights how much relevant it is to revisit the so-called “classics” of the political thought, more specifically in favor of the present work, the legacy of the skeptical school, a doctrine that teaches us not to fall under imposed dogmas, in other words, not to adhere to a system of not evident propositions. Therefore, we admit the relevance of objections in order to result in such posture, when assumed in its fullness, in a stagnation; which we eliminate with the adherence of the “possible” that is exposed by the Kantian thinking.

Hereupon we will endeavor to reflect over a Schimittian criticism to contingent and pragmatic principled junction between Liberalism and democracy. This junction, to the referred author, is faded to fail since its beginning, such as in the Marxist criticism to the capitalism:

> The matter consists in knowing whether we may get a specific political idea from the pure and consequent concept of individualistic liberalism. To this, we must answer with the negative. For the negation of the political that is contained in any consequent individualism certainly leads to a political praxis of distrust against all political powers and state formats we can imagine, however it never leads to an own and positive political and state theory (SCHMITT, 1992, p.97)

We stress that such criticism does not target the democracy itself in a destructive sense that is always a goal in the thoughts of the referred author, due to his modus operandi of taking properly seriously his adversaries. Therefore, it shall be a positive contribution in order to elevate the reflection about democracy for itself for beyond the not politicized zone promoted by the Liberalism. Nevertheless, we must not ignore the contribution of such movement in what concerns to the individual freedom, what in fact will not be observed in here.

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⁴ Any reference presented in this work is a proximate translation.
Thus, the adoption of the Schmittian criticism consists the touchstone for a correction of the perpetrated apolitical character, and notwithstanding the potentiation of the democrat thinking and spirit. Therefore, we will adopt the referred criticism not in a dogmatic sense, which should be followed indiscriminately, but as the conducting wire which we intend to overcome, maybe not in a peremptory way, but that comes to indicate a path to be followed, revealing one more step for the constant “ought to be” that consists the way of the political philosophy and despite the political science on a broad sense.

**Agonistic Foundation**

We begin the present section with the evocation of the paradigm of the possible worlds (LESSA, 2003, pp.103,104), that is all the associative infinity which the objective world can be coated with, and is effectively coated with the reservation of its proper apprehension in space-time, taking as a starting point the multiplicity of human lucubration. About this matter, Hanna Arendt brilliantly expresses her understanding about the human “creationist” character. In other words, the liberty with which the human being (in its plurality), instead of the humanity that is the major expression of the above referred attribute suppression, in the means that there is an imperative designation given by history, is coated when inserted in the political field to make something new, in the author's words:

“It becomes hard to comprehend that we should be in fact free in a field, that is, not even moved by ourselves nor dependent on the given material. There is freedom only in the particular scope of the internal concept of the politics. We save from this freedom right in the need of the history. An abominable absurd.” (ARENDT, 1998, p.24)

Regarding her concern to this reducibility of the human capacity, Arendt alerts for the matter of judging in the modernity, which is presented in two aspects: one in subordinating the individual to the general, in other words, to submit to current criteria; and the other when we face up with things for which there is no known parameters. This last aspect is under the Nihilism denomination or synonyms such as:

“(…) human judgments can only be demanded where they have parameters, that the capacity of discernment is nothing more than the capacity to aggregate in a correct and adequate way, the isolated to the general in which it corresponds and came to terms. It is known that the capacity of discernment insists and must insist in judge in a direct way and without parameters.” (ARENDT, 1998, p.33)
Though, we must object, when due opportunity, the epistemic disagreement by which the proposal of (re)composition of the objective reality will pass, not as a reducibility, that is, diminishing it, but as a suitability to the real character of the human understanding, limiting it, establishing at what extent it may reach. In the following section it will be imminent a touch with the theoretical constructs of Carl Schmitt about “sovereignty”, “decision”, and “politics”.

In his exposition about the concept of the political, there is an explanation about the categories of specifically political understanding, that is, those in which the political thinking must be supported in order to act with property. So, the criteria that gives the condition of political itself is the distinction between “friend-enemy”, that is: “The difference between friend and enemy has the meaning to designate the degree of extreme intensity of a connection or separation, of an association or disassociation.” (SCHMITT, 1992: p.52). Accordingly, the one that may represent an existential danger to a certain political organized group would be called “enemy” and should be fought, being the “war” another category of the political horizon, taking it seriously as the author likes to treat his “enemies” in his works, and it can even reach the level of an extermination war.

This is the crucial point in the theory of Schmitt and Arendt, once the least author abhors such result due to her plural world representation. Yet she sees the “destroying” as dissociable from the “building” inherits of the human strength and capacity; likewise, Schmitt also recognizes the extremity of this extent in the political field, once for the configuration of this ambit as not meddling in the others of the human thinking and action, it is necessary the existence of an enemy, but accepts it as possible in an ultimate degree.

Similarly, when discoursing about the historical conceptions over sovereignty, running through Hobbes and Bodin, Schmitt correlates the two political categories of “sovereignty” and “decision” from the observing of exception state, as the juridical figures use to set. It becomes the most interesting concept for the fact that “the normal proves nothing, exception proves it all”; it not only confirms the rule, but the rule itself only lives because of exception” (SCHMITT, 1996, p.94), once this situation reveals what is beyond the instituted, not covered by regulations or juridical figures, despite its necessary juridical prevision which cannot act in an analytic way for not having enough elements of what is to come, and therefore reveal the need for an authority capable of deciding about the moment of deflagration and, consequently, solve it in view of the impossibility of an endogenous response given by a positively valued systematic-rationalist order, which notwithstanding its mere prevision could not provide it specific details and purposeful actions.

The fact of a regulation, order, or a point of accountability “implants itself” seems to be an easily imaginable supposition, for this kind of juridical rationalism. However, as the unity and the systematic order could suspend itself in a concrete case it is something hard to conceive, and keeps being a juridical problem while the state of exception is distinct from the juridical chaos of any kind (SCHMITT, 1992, p. 93)
Indeed, resides in the ruler’s power, which would be unlimited in this view, make the transition from the emergency state to the normality, in a concrete situation and in an existential sense. It would reverberate in a new normative possibility once there is no “regulation applicable in chaos. The order must be implanted so that the juridical order makes sense. A normal situation must be created, and ruler is the one who decides, definitely, if such state is really predominant” (SCHMITT, 1992: p.93)

At this point, some elucidation is necessary. In the Schmittian concept, democracy should have as a principle regulating the identity one, that is, identity between rulers and ruled ones. A homogeneous space of normative application would be necessary (SCHMITT,1992, p.92). Considering this, his conclusion about the regular principle of democracy, Schmitt comes to consider as possible democracy in an authoritarian regime: “Bolshevism and the fascism are certainly anti liberal, as all dictatorship, but not necessarily anti democrat” (SCHMITT apud MOUFFE,1992, p. 2).

Such position derives from his strong criticism against the liberalism, about what is going to be talked later. That said we combat that such theoretical position may have any positive use. That is, it cannot be understood in a way that legitimates authoritarian regimes, as some intend, but in a way to provide the proper identity required above. The path to reach such thing is a hard task for those who look into the practical field and, as initially affirmed, reflexive of the political science.

Therefore, we make clear there is no bad intention in the use of this finding, which is the need for the effectiveness of the identity principle, but indeed represents the disclosure of a contradiction found by the author, once the individualism required by one inhibits the implement of the other.

Therefore, we conclude that the implement of such principle of identity does not necessarily come through authoritarian ways. We can present as example the Rousseanian construct of “general will” as an adverse possibility to the referred authoritarianism – disregarding, as an exemplary order, the considerations about the implementation premises (axiological, e.g.) of this state (situation) – as a mean of implementing what is proposed. Thus, we conclude that every proposition in this sense represents a possibility, and not a necessity.

With everything that was exposed so far, we come to the following position: the disclosure that the human being, as it always brings the capacity to create something new over what has been instituted, residing here a supposed Schmittian/Arendtian paradigm – not dogmatic, some questions are revealed simultaneously: the implementation of the new comes from a deliberative and consensual plurality, as nostalgically Arendt aspired when discoursing about the greek polis, or there would be the possibility of establishing the homogeneous ground of normative implementation, where popular sovereignty would be effectively represented, as Schimitt presented to us (always avoiding bad intentioned interpretations, we asserted that the possibility of a democracy instituted by an authoritarianism shall
not be cogitated, so that there are propositions in this direction by contemporary proponents of “radical democracy”, which resides in the extreme opposite of this supposition)?

**Gnoseological Abysses**

This part of the work is going to be an expatiation about how much relevant becomes the skeptical teaching, once through such line of thinking we understand that for each theoretical formulation will be always and necessarily possible an imaginative contraposition. It justifies the revisiting of so important concepts of a determined school – to the extent that represents “a certain argumentative line showing how it is possible to live correctly (correctly being understood referring not only to the virtue, but in a wider meaning (...)” (EMPÍRICO, 1997, pp,118, 119) – such as “Diaphony”, “Epoche” and “Ataraxy”.

Skepticism arose in classical Antiquity as a reaction to the proliferation of philosophical systems all of them oriented to detect the truth. In more precise terms, the skeptical attitude emerges from the discovery that philosophy is a playing field between systems that support that there is a deep distinction between what is and what appears to be. (LESSA, 2008, p. 5)

However, the skeptical position alone, devoid of logical-metaphysical reflection and broad theoretical framework, does not makes distinction on “analytic truths” (*a priori*) and “synthetic truths” (*a posteriori*), thus, it doesn’t reach facts in its contingent or general significance nor foresees any particular meaning contingently understood as fact (QUINE, 1951, pp.20-21). Therefore, a purely empirical approach tends to be reductionist about human phenomena, because each significant fact receives its own meaning from any logical construct concerning its own as immediate experience (QUINE, 1951, pp.34-35). In this sense, the skeptical position will be relativized as groundwork from the very important Kantian criticism, by which such positioning, when taken to the extreme, would result in stagnation, as evidenced by one of his canons of principles (*ataraxy*)

Such investigation reveals itself of in the same importance, once we limit the human knowledge, in contrariety to rationalist postulations that tends to comprehend all, a criticism degree will be posteriorly raised about the *Diaphonical* “visions of the world” related to the theory of democracy and, notwithstanding, it will highlight how a political decision have a character of fideism once there is no applicability of patterns such as “good-bad”, “beauty-ugly”, and “useful-harmful”; it is because of the fact that the character of fideism results from the strength that the decision politically considered possesses to aggregate or disassociate politically existent invidious. When reading the Pyrrho’s hypothesis, a kind of “skeptical manifest”, we face with the issue raised by this current of thinking about the reflection over “good or bad”. Such considerations always result in a concern, that is, we will search for the state characterized as the
good one in contrariety to the bad one; arising from that the reflexive need. Yet in his line of thinking, all theoretical system that brings the explanation of a certain phenomenon (a term borrowed from the Kantian doctrine) will be open to a contraposition (diaphonia), which consequently would take skeptical to suspend any kind of judgment (epoche) and would result to the so acclaimed tranquility (ataraxy), that is, once the skeptical on its reflexions “finds himself before the equipollence in controversies, and cannot decide about it, adopted the suspension”; such posture highlights an exacerbation about the sensible impressions, which are determined as criteria of legitimacy for the action, once they are not liable to questioning.

(…) We have action criteria, according to those in our daily lives we practice certain acts and avoid others, and we treat here about such criteria. We say than that for the skeptic the criteria is the appearance, which means the sensible impressions, once they consist in involuntary affections and sensations, therefore they are not liable to questioning. So, presumably, no one will discuss if something that exists has this or that appearance, the discussion is if that, in fact, corresponds to what it looks like.” (EMPÍRICO, 1997, pp.116, 121)

At this point, after a brief explanation, far from any arrogant impulse, in order to highlight the genius point of this reflection, and, nevertheless, offer you some retouch, we disagree of such last ending of the skeptical positioning, which is tranquility, and its ethos guided by the sensible impressions; even because of the the fact that those offer essential elements for human reflection, as forward we will try to show, but not exhausting all possible knowledge. Aiming to offer a certain precision to the exposed about the skeptical legacy, we open space for the name who was responsible for one of the greatest turns in human thinking: Immanuel Kant and his critique of pure reason. Indeed we state here that the human knowledge does not have as a goal the objects themselves, what is nominated by the author as transcendental, and, as we formulate a system of such concepts we would a priori institute a transcendental philosophy: “I call transcendental all knowledge that in general occupies itself not so much with objects, but with our way of knowing objects, once it must be possible a priori” (KANT, 1980, p.33)

That is, the Kantian revolution admits the nature of things, objects taken on themselves, as something inexhaustible, and due to that, he establishes as object of his reason criticism the constitution of a canon of knowledge a priori, contained inside the own human reason, through which it becomes possible the judging of the nature of things, taken as phenomena. What “a skeptical school” would define as “principle of action”, that is, those elements arising from the sensible impressions, Kant would define as formats of intuition, that is:
“Since the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily proceeds every intuition of those objects, we understand how the form of all phenomena can be processed in the minds before all actualized perceptions, consequently a priori, and with it, while a pure intuition in which every object must be determined, can contain, before every experience, principles of their relations” (KANT, 1980, p.42)

Therefore, because of the categories of representation (space/time) of our sensibility, we can represent the object, not as it is itself, but as a subjective reality, respecting its subjective conditions of the sensible intuition, objectively represented, “cannot be included even subsisting nor inhering the objects themselves” (KANT, 1980, p.47)

Furthermore, it is not only in the mere intuition where the human understanding resides, or it would configure a fumble in the dark; case in which we diagnose the skeptical reflection in service of the sensible impressions in search of tranquility. That said, the human comprehension does not exhaust by the process of representation given by intuition. There is still the synthetic process a priori where the unity from the multiple given by intuition, by means of concept, is formed. The great relevance of this process subjective character resides here, in the means that the pure apperception is needed “for being that self-conscience that when produces the representation I think which must follow all the others and it is one and identical in all conscience, cannot be followed by any other.” (KANT, 1980, p. 85)

Indeed, if the self-consciousness was not part of all multiple representations, given by intuition, they could not be denominated as being part of the cognoscente subject, being than subordinated to the condition of the self-consciousness synthesis. This process of formation of the conscience unity is, thus, the foundation for the knowledge of an object given as phenomena, and consequently, of all possible experience.

“The synthetic unity of consciousness is an objective condition of all knowledge, which I need for myself not only to know an object, but in which all intuition has to be in order to become object to me, otherwise, in another way and without this synthesis of the multiple it would not join in a conscience.” (KANT, 1980, p. 87)

Thus, the statement exposed by the Hanna Arendt about “judging in a direct way with no parameters” can be understood from the Kantian perspective as a reformulation of what it becomes acceptance in a space-time limit, once it is impossible to reach an ultimate truth from which all essence of the object politically discussed would be extracted. And the great importance of the skeptical teaching resides here, even not having followed the correct way (here considered as so) in the consideration over epistemology, already recognized the diaphonic character of

276
the theoretical postulations, and its suspension of judgment (epoche), it must not be understood in a lethargic, inaction, intuitive sense.

It is revealed as something of great importance the Schmittian's notes about the fideistic and aggregation character of the political in relation to the decision-making, and it is because of the inappropriate designation in such ambit for a decision such as “right or wrong”, “useful or harmful”.

Therefore, when we are capable of aggregating a certain group of people able to “fight” (here we use the proper Schmittian vocabulary, despite its possible institutional significance, therefore, for beyond the jus belli) for the ideal shared, in consonance with the principle of identity between “governors” and “governed ones”, a determined existential positioning will be accepted as valid, for beyond the moralist and economic borders. (SCHMITT; 1992, p.92)

Theories of Democracy

In the present section of the paper we will embark in the short exposition of some exponent theorist of modern democracy, such as Kelsen, Habermas and Bobbio. It brings the intention to enrich the reflection put into practice, once right after that it will be exposed to the criticism made by Schimitt against such so-called liberal theories. Such itinerary does not aim the adhesion of the antithesis proposed by this author, or the thesis of another, but evidence the undertaken diaphonia, and based on that, try to evidence a possible substratum for a further active proposition. Adhering to a formalism, Noberto Borbbio defines as democratic regime the “group of regulations and procedures that aim the formation of collective decisions counting on the most part possible of the interested ones” (BOBBIO; 2000, p. 22).

Therefore, the democratic regime is represented by the procedural instruments that give legitimacy to a certain political decision. Furthermore, Bobbio states that for the actualization of the democratic regime, it is necessary the actualization of individual liberty, expression, opinion and association principles. Therefore, liberalism is a historical and juridical prerequisite for the State democratic regime. (BOBBIO; 2000, p. 32).

Another mark of the modern thinking about democracy, covered however by an empiric aspect, is the exposed by Robert Dahl and Arend Lipjhart, for whom the democratic regime is configured by the cumulative presence of certain elements, respectively: a) Effective participation in politics; b) Equal vote among adults; c) Acquisition of a clarified understanding about the institutions and political candidates; d) exercise control of state planning for accountability (DAHL, 2001) a) Sharing of the executive power through broad coalition cabinets; b) Equilibrium between executive and legislative power; c) multiparty system; d) proportional representation; e) corporatism of the interest groups; f) a
decentralized and federal government; g) strong bicameralism; h) constitutional rigidity and judicial review; i) Independence of the central bank (LIPJHART, 2003)

Moving on, we find in Kelsen a functional criteria for the justification of democracy, that is, we cannot cognitiate about an absolute justification for it. It is, functionally, found in the understanding of the acting individuals. Thus, through Kelsean perspective, we negate the possibility of a substantial homogeneity, if it is presumed a debate made by parliamentary representativism. Therefore, Kelsen states that the modern democracy must be understood as being defined by a certain number of procedures through which the parliament and the parties play a central role, so that they are the necessary instruments for the creation of the state will. (KELSEN, apud MOUFFE, 1992, pp. 7, 8).

In a diverse sense, Habermas, influenced by his own discursive theory, declares that the core of democracy is the process of institutionalization of discourses and negotiation with the aide from the forms of communication. Therefore, through the discursive concept, we submit all action norm to the acceptance from those who participate in the rational discourses, in the same way that with them they are related. Thus, we assume an alternative to the principle of identity, according as the democratic State, and its inherent normative institutionalization, grants the effectuation of such principle among those who construct it and finds themselves related to it, being the respect to the individual rights the limiting factor to this multitude's legislative process. Thus, we align the Habermasian theory with the liberalism for excelling the disassociation between “State” and “Civil Society”, once it aims to reduce the state influence over the individual freedom; notwithstanding, it also recognizes that it is in the State where the most elevate format of popular sovereignty is expressed. That said, Habermas, when excelling for the rational deliberative process as the foundation of legal regulations and the organization of public power, establishes the principle of representativeness, in a pragmatic order, as subsidiary and needed. (ARRUDA, 2011, pp. 105-130)

Chantal Mouffe exposes a relevant observation about the necessary distinction that we must make for the correct functioning of the Habermasian model, the one between the “interest agreement” and “rational agreement”. (MOUFFE, 1999, pp. 38, 53). This point is shown as very important to the critical approach of the way as the politics, by the means of its procedures, is practiced.

After briefly exposing some of the main modern democratic theories, the work will follow bringing the exposition of the Schmittian criticism against the implement of the metaphysical system perpetrated by the liberal ethos, which is the individualism. It is not against the liberalism in favor of the authoritarianism, but as the disclosure of its contradictions, in order to, this way, establish an adequation proposition aiming to strengthen the reflection about democracy.
Liberalism and Politics

In his astute historical reading, Schmitt notices that the articulation between liberalism and democracy happens in the confrontation of the bourgeoisie against the monarchical power occurred in the 19th century. Such confrontation results in a necessary distinction between State and society, which transposes and concentrates this confrontation to a specific scope: the parliament. Such confrontation is not direct, that is, between general will and personalist will; but a confrontation through representatives of the people. Its product would be a rational and universal group or laws that would subordinate the power of the monarch.

In this transposition, which aims the limiting of the concentrated power to the monarch itself, resides a danger announced by Schmitt, which is the transmutation of the concept of law: it would be restricted only to what comes from the parliament. Thus, Schmitt questions about what the validity foundation is to reside in this matter the genesis legitimacy of the general will (supposedly) stated in a rational sense. He believes that such thought results in such a liberal metaphysical belief that the production of the truth and of justice would come through the discussion and free exchange of opinions. (ARRUDA, 2011, pp. 105-130). In Schmittian words:

“The liberalism, based on its typical dilemma between spirit and economy, tried to reduce the enemy into a rival, under the economy perspective, and into an opponent of discussions, under the spirit perspective. In the economic field, in fact, there are no enemies, but only rivals, and in a totally moralized and ethical world maybe only opponents of discussions still remain.” (SCHMITT, 1992, p. 54)

This perspective of an eternal discussion reveals itself as harmful, once it dislocates issues of existential interests from a certain political unity, capable of establishing that “friend” and “enemy” conglomerate, to an individual range, and with this prevent the substantial change which would be product of the “sovereign decision” when it is necessary. For this the attention to the state of exception, again, becomes enlightening; once the “Rule of Law” is never capable of embracing such situation, and henceforth establish propositional measures to it.

Therefore, when we discuss about matters of second order, and set aside matters that bring polemic potential (political) for the individualism treatment, we would depoliticize the social environment, treating the parliamentary discussion as a mere “rational accordance” (using here the terminology coined in the prognosis made by Mouffe about the Habermasian theory), and, consequently, reinforce the antagonism in the social environment. At this point, it is important to make an analogy to the figure proposed by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan about the state of nature (in the case of an environment where the individual ambit is where the
search for satisfaction happens), protecting, of course, the specific character of a snip, once in the Schmittian sense, the social contract would be an institutional breakdown, in view of his homogeneous conception of a public unity, which should exist since ever and not be built by the means of an accordance. So, in view of his conception, which appreciates the homogeneity inside a political unity, he refutes the pluralism; moreover, Schmitt opposes to the democracy proceduralist theorists. This is in view of his substantial search for a concept of equality inside the public unity. “In fact the worries of Schmitt lie upon the public unity; he believes the State cannot exist without it. For him, this unity consists in a common existence from which citizens participate, and that permits them to be treated as equals in a democracy.” (MOUFFE, 1992, pp. 8, 9) The disclosure of this substantial unity presented by Schmitt is what rises much distrust in relation to his thoughts leaning to the totalitarianism.

Chantal Mouffe guides us through this confusion when exposing the proposition of Herman Heller when he revisits the Schmittian’s concept of political, about a “certain level of social homogeneity and shared political social values to the accomplishment of the democratic unity” (MOUFFE, 1992, p. 9); what does not exclude a certain social antagonism. This way, the theoretical foundation of a parliamentary democracy is found “not in the belief of a public discussion itself, but in the belief that there is a common base of discussion and the fair game for the opponent, whereby we wish to get to an accordance under the condition of ruling out the pure and simple brutal force.” (HELLER apud MOUFFE. 1992, p. 9).

Thus, passing by the Schmittian criticism without adhering so, we find a synthesis: the individual liberties that represent the triumph of the liberal bourgeoisie should not be abdicated in favor of a totalitarian-personalist power. Likewise, the search for the formation of a certain homogeneity (conferring by the principles of equality and liberty) where the general will should be formed, excluding the jus belli, by means of procedures and mechanisms that grant the possibility and concede effectiveness to it.

Conclusion

According to the exposed by Schmitt, as the liberalism aims to eradicate the conflict from the social, in view of its simultaneous aggregations to the State, and, thus, result in a depoliticization of the properly political ambit, we intend to revert the positioning with the exposed so far. Thereby, we do not intend to follow the Schmittian criticism, from which we used as support so far, in a fideistic way, but before our intention is to conciliate it with the most democratic possible aspect, which is currently denominated as “ultra-democracy”. Therefore, we aim for an elaboration that does not target the destruction of the political ente, at the existential sense, or its depoliticization in the individualist practice:
(...) one of the main tasks of the democratic politics is to neutralize the potential antagonism that exists in the social relations. If we accept that it cannot be done transcending the us/them relation, but only elaborating it a different way, we come across the following questioning: what would constitute a relation of tamed antagonism (...) (MOUFFE, 2015, p.18)

Henceforth, the agonic posture arises, where pluralism is recognized and there is no aim for its eradication from the political, where its negation would reside in case of occurring. Thereby, the pair friend-enemy gains features of us-them, that is, the capacity exists for a political instituted agglomeration for the (re)configuration of the object of the political decision, once every religious, moral, economic or any other antagonism becomes a political one provided it is strong enough to cause the effective regrouping of men into friends and into enemies.” (SCHMITT, 1992, p. 77). This without the determination of “them” as being the enemy to be destroyed. thus, we conciliate the issue raised by Hanna Arendt about the driving pluralism of the social world, highlighting the topic where we elucidated the gnoseological human capacity, with the fideism: once there is no rational parameter of definition such as right-wrong, useful-harmful, beauty-ugly in the political ambit and on their decisions, this kind of specifical reflection must be elucidated as one from the several possibilities of representation of the world that, diaphonically, not only can but should be confronted, creating an agglomerate capable of defending its execution. The contribution of the proceduralism theorists reveals itself here as important once they formulate ways in the walking of the agonistic elaboration.

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